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BEYOND MISCLASSIFICATION:
THE DIGITAL TRANSFORMATION OF WORK

Miriam A. Cherry*
As the Internet and computer technology have become increasingly
ubiquitous, new ways to buy and sell not only objects, but also time,
effort, and labor have been developed. In an earlier article I termed this
trend “virtual work,” 1 and it has been alternately described as “labor as a
service,” “peer production,” “playbor,” or “crowdwork.” 2
Some
processes of “crowdwork” or “micro-labor” involve computer-based work
that is performed wholly in cyberspace, where work is broken down into
its smallest constituent parts (such as coding, describing, or tagging the
thousands of items for sale on a website). 3 Other types of crowdwork are
aided by cellphone applications (“apps”) or websites, and they rely on
technology to deploy workers to perform tasks (such as driving, grocery
delivery, or home repair services) for requesters in the real world who pay
for these services, with the app or platform keeping a percentage of the
exchange.
According to a recent survey conducted by Time Magazine, over
14 million people currently work in the “gig,” “on demand” or “sharing”
economy. 4 While these statistics have been the subject of controversy, 5
*
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1
Miriam A. Cherry, A Taxonomy of Virtual Work, 45 GA. L. REV. 951 (2011) (using term “virtual work”
broadly not only to encompass virtual worlds but also to refer to work taking place online, including the type of
micro-labor crowdwork performed on Amazon’s Mechanical Turk).
2
See Trebor Scholz & Laura Liu, From Mobile Playgrounds to Sweatshop City, SITUATED
TECHNOLOGIES PAMPHLETS 7 (2010), http://www.situatedtechnologies.net/?q= node/105.
3
See, e.g. Jeff Howe, The Rise of Crowdsourcing, WIRED, June 2006, at 176, 178-79 (using term
“crowdsourcing” to describe work performed with the aid of contributions from diverse groups of users on the
internet); Deborah Halbert, Mass Culture and the Culture of the Masses, A Manifesto for User-Generated
Rights, 11 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 921, 929 (2009) (“Computer technology in the hands of the masses has
made available software programs that can create music, documents, and art just as well as expensive studios
did in the past. This democratization of technology disrupts the monopoly on the creative means of production.
The world of amateur production also demonstrates that many are motivated by noncommercial reasons.”).
4
Katy Steinmetz, Exclusive: See How Big the Gig Economy Really Is, TIME, Jan.6, 2016 available at
http://time.com/4169532/sharing-economy-poll/
5
Cole Stangler, December Jobs Report: How Many Gig Economy Workers are There, Really?, INT’L BUS.
TIMES, Jan. 8, 2016, available at http://www.ibtimes.com/december-jobs-report-how-many-gig-economy-

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2734288
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there can be no doubt that technology is re-shaping the future of work.
Examples include websites and apps that range from Amazon Mechanical
Turk, 6 Handy, 7 Instacart, 8 to Uber. 9 These new companies’ labor
practices have sparked intense litigation in the United States. Currently,
the litigation is focusing on a common doctrinal issue – whether the
workers in the platform, on-demand economy have the status of
employees or independent contractors. The question of employee status is
particularly important because many of the rights and benefits provided
for in U.S. employment law (minimum wage, protection from
discrimination, unemployment insurance, worker’s compensation) are only
triggered for those who are deemed to be “employees.” 10
The first part of this article provides a brief litigation update on the
various worker lawsuits within the on-demand economy. While O’Connor
v. Uber11 has received the lion’s share of attention and analysis, 12 similar
lawsuits on labor standards have been filed against other on-demand
economy platforms. Analysis of the ongoing litigation reveals several
important themes, including an emphasis on the labor law of California.
The second part of the article shifts from the doctrinal issues around
misclassification to look at the larger picture. Based on the work of
Katherine Van Wezel Stone, 13 the second part argues that we are currently
experiencing a far-reaching digital transformation of work. The changes
include the growth of automatic management and a move toward ever
more precarious work. To the extent that technology can help us realize
Stone’s vision of knowledge work with increased training and the
“boundary-less career,” that is positive. It is questionable, however, if
workers-are-there-really-2255765. In the article, prominent economists Alan Kreuger and Larry Mishel both
quibble with the numbers in the Time survey, supra note [ ], arguing that the numbers of on-demand economy
workers are far lower. What is interesting is that both economists have ideological reasons for minimizing the
number of workers. If the number of workers in the on-demand economy is small, that supports the argument
that there is no need for regulation, a notion that Kreuger, who once consulted for Uber, could get behind. The
reason for Mishel’s minimization of the on demand economy is cloudy, but it may have to do with the idea that
labor unions should continue to appeal to their traditional base and ignore technological change. Lawrence
Mishel, Uber is Not the Future of Work, THE ATLANTIC, Nov. 16, 2015. Such a stance seems extremely shortsighted. In any event, the idea that technology is not important to work is belied by many examples, from Ned
Ludd’s displacement by the power loom to John Henry’s defeat by the steam engine.
6
https://www.mturk.com/mturk/welcome
7
http://www.handy.com/
8
https://www.instacart.com/
9
www.uber.com
10
See infra Part I.
11
O’Connor v. Uber, 3:13-cv-03826-EMC (N.D. Cal.).
12
For just a small sampling of press coverage, see, e.g. James Surowiecki, Gigs with Benefits, NEW
YORKER,
July
6,
2015,
available
at
http://www.newyorker.com/
magazine/2015/07/06/gigs-with-benefits; Mark R. Warner, Asking Tough Questions About the Gig Economy,
WASH. POST, June 18, 2015, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/asking-tough-questions-about-the-gigeconomy/2015/06/18/b43f2d0a-1461-11e5-9ddc-e3353542100c_story.html.
13
KATHERINE V.W. STONE, FROM WIDGETS TO DIGITS (2004).

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2734288
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crowdwork truly extends the framework for digital work. In some
aspects, the new crowdwork seems a throwback to the de-skilled industrial
processes associated with Taylor, but without the loyalty and job security.
I. Litigation in the On Demand Economy
This section provides an update of current on-demand worker
litigation in the United States. 14 Of necessity this article provides a
temporal snapshot, as these cases are rapidly developing. As of this
writing many of the important legal issues are uncertain, as they were
settled out of court or are currently set for trial. Why the wait from the
time when these companies began operating and when these litigations
were filed? I would posit that the lag is due to the fact that fundamental
questions about labor standards have been obscured by the rhetoric of the
“sharing economy” or “cooperative economics.”
Ridesharing company Lyft originally positioned itself within the
Bay Area as a type of collective service where neighbors with cars helped
those who were without. The result was supposed to build on community
spirit and to encourage environmentally-conscious behavior such as
ridesharing or carpooling. This putative “sharing economy” tapped into the
long and venerable history of collective community sharing initiatives.15 In
the past, resources were often shared amongst a community based on ties of
kinship, friendship, or religious affiliation. Communities also set up
exchange systems based on “barter” or timeshares, where individuals were
able to bank and trade the time and skills, and groups shared tools or
machinery.16 Indeed, we need look no further than the institution of the
lending library to see instances where collective resources keep citizens
well-informed and educated.17
These collective efforts depended on a
mixture of trade, volunteerism, and altruism.18
For some time these roots in cooperative sharing structures obscured
the commercial component of the on-demand economy. In my 2013 article,
Cyber Commodification, I analyzed the ways in which segments of
cyberspace were becoming either free and open access or, on the other
hand, becoming commodified spaces.19 The lines between the monetized
14

The importance of keeping track of these cases and analyzing their outcomes is detailed in Claire
Zillman, California’s Uber Driver Decision Could Throw a Wrench into the Sharing Economy, FORTUNE, June
17, 2015, available at http://fortune.com/2015/06/17/uber-drivers-are-employees-sharing-economy/.
15
Jenny Kassan & Janelle Orsi, The Legal Landscape of the Sharing Economy, 27 J. ENVIRONMENTAL L.
& LITIG., 1, 4 (2012).
16
Id. See generally JANELL ORSI, PRACTICING LAW IN THE SHARING ECONOMY (2012).
17
Id.
18
On altruism, see LYNN STOUT, CULTIVATING CONSCIENCE: HOW GOOD LAWS MAKE GOOD PEOPLE
(2010).
19
See generally Miriam A. Cherry, Cyber Commodification, 72 MD. L. REV. 381 (2013).
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and the free seemed in some instances to blur, causing confusion and
sparking contests and disputes.20 In some instances, businesses struggled to
monetize the value that was being created through new efficiencies,
connections between people, and use of underutilized resources.21 With the
rise of the on-demand apps, it seems that business owners have, (at least in
part), figured out how to harness some of the value and efficiencies created
by these technologies.22
In terms of the litigation update, the ridesharing/taxi services Uber
and Lyft have probably garnered the most attention over their labor
practices, so we will begin with them. 23 Uber alone has approximately
400,000 drivers in the United States, 24 and ridesharing services have
become especially popular with customers in densely populated east and
west coast cities. Rather than hailing or flagging down a cab in a crowded
street, or calling a phone number to order a cab, the customer summons a
taxi by using an application (“app”) on their cellphone, which is GPSenabled. The app matches available drivers, who are using their
privately-owned vehicles, with passengers nearby who need rides.
Customers often prefer this type of model as opposed to hailing or calling
a cab because the app is faster and more convenient, and has the benefit of
allowing the passenger to track where the driver is and thus to have a
better sense of scheduling the trip.
Originally, some of the litigation and opposition to these
ridesharing services came either from existing taxicab owners and from
local governments. Largely unregulated and unlicensed, (and in many
instances even perhaps uninsured), questions existed about safety
concerns. Uber has largely brushed those concerns aside, adopting an
aggressive litigation stance. 25 For example, the Metropolitan Taxi
Commission in St. Louis originally refused to let Uber operate in the city
limits because of a lack of background checks for drivers. Uber then sued
20

Id. at 426-439.
Id. at 435-439 (noting difficulty of businesses in monetizing WiFi service).
22
See also Rashmi Dyal-Chand, Regulating Sharing: The Sharing Economy as an Alternative Capitalist
System, 90 TUL. L. REV. 241 (2015) (arguing that current forms of regulation do not fit well with the sharing
economy because of a lack of fit with traditional business models). The qualifier of “at least in part” is due to
the fact that some Internet companies, such as Facebook, still have not figured out optimal monetization.
23
Benjamin Means & Joseph A. Seiner, Navigating the Uber Economy, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. __ (2016)
(examining doctrinal tests for employee and independent contractor status in the Uber litigation).
24
This was the approximate size of the class certified in O’Connor v. Uber.
25
Brishen Rogers, The Social Costs of Uber, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. DIALOGUE 85, 102 (2015) (“Which brings us
back to the public's mistrust of Uber. The company's name clearly evinces Nietzsche's vision of a new morality
and a new class dedicated to human excellence. But in Uber executives' hands, that ideal has become little more
than a defense of privilege. The company's leaders seem just fine with a future in which the many are supplicant
to the few, and the few are licensed to disregard ordinary rules. Uber's slogan--“Everyone's private driver”--speaks
volumes. Perhaps the public's intuitive skepticism toward Uber reflects a widespread sense that our economy
should reflect basic democratic values.”) (internal citation omitted).
21
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the Taxi Commission in federal court, alleging antitrust violations for their
exclusion. 26 The St. Louis Taxi Commission has in return also brought a
lawsuit seeking to enjoin Uber’s operations, and Uber is being sued by
individual taxi drivers as well. 27
In the litigation in the Northern District of California, Uber drivers
filed suit, seeking minimum wage protections and overtime pay under the
Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”). 28 The availability of the FSLA,
however, depends first and foremost upon a finding that a worker, or class
of workers, are “employees.” 29 Under U.S. law, whether a worker is an
employee or independent contractor is determined through various
multifactored tests dependent on the facts of the relationship. 30 The
“control” test derives from the caselaw and decisions on agency law, and
focuses on a principal’s right to control the worker. Other papers in this
colloquium will address these issues more in-depth, 31 but suffice it to say
that some of the factors for finding employee status are whether the
employer may direct the way in which the work is performed, determine
the hours involved, and provide the employee with direction. 32 On the
other hand, elements that lean toward independent contractor classification
include high-skilled work, workers providing their own equipment,
workers setting their own schedules, and getting paid per project, not per
hour. 33 In an alternate test, courts examine the economic realities of the
relationship to determine whether the worker is exhibiting entrepreneurial
activity, or whether the worker is financially dependent upon the
26
For a short summary of the long and tortured story of Uber in Saint Louis, Missouri, see Leah Thorsen,
St. Louis Area Taxi Drivers File Suit Against Uber, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Nov. 16, 2015, available at
http://www.stltoday.com/news/local/metro/st-louis-area-taxi-drivers-file-suit-against-uber/article_f2c2a69f90cb-58a6-b513-d122cb6189cd.html. The various cases that are pending in court include St. Louis
Metropolitan Taxicab Commission v. Uber, Inc. et al., 4:15-cv-01562-HEA (E.D. Mo. 2015); Wallen et al v. St.
Louis Metropolitan Taxicab Commission et al., 4:15-cv-01432-HEA (E.D. Mo. 2015); Vilcek, et al. v. Uber
USA, LLC, et al., 4:15-CV-1900 (E.D. Mo. 2015).
27
Id.
28
Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 203(e)(1).
29
29 U.S.C. § 203(g).
30
See Katharine V.W. Stone, Legal Protections for Atypical Employees: Employment Law for Workers
without Workplaces and and Employees without Employers, 27 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 251, 257-58 (2006)
(listing factors from the cases). Oft-cited cases on this subject include Rutherford Food Corp. v. McComb, 331
U.S. 722, 728-29 (1947); Ira S. Bushey & Sons, Inc. v. U.S., 398 F.2d 167 (2d Cir. 1968); Nationwide Mut. Ins.
Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 326 (1992).
31
[Insert cross references to other papers in the volume].
32
See, e.g. Herman v. Express Sixty-Minutes Delivery Service, Inc., 161 F.3d 299 (5th Cir. 1998).
33
See, e.g. Richard R. Carlson, Variations on A Theme of Employment: Labor Law Regulation of Alternative
Worker Relations, 37 S. TEX. L. REV. 661, 663 (1996) (“Most labor and employment laws assume a paradigmatic
relationship between an “employer” and “employee.” The employer in this model contracts directly with an
individual employee to perform an indefinite series or duration of tasks, subject to the employer's actual or
potential supervision over the employee's method, manner, time and place of performance. This model describes
most workers well enough, but there has always been a large pool of workers in alternative relationships with
recipients of services. Some workers are “independent contractors” who contract to perform specific tasks or
achieve particular results, but who retain independence and self-management over their performance.”).
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employer. 34 The label affixed to the relationship is a factor in the
outcome, but it is certainly not dispositive. In any event, the tests are
notoriously malleable, even when dealing with what should be a fairly
straightforward analysis. 35
Thus Uber’s situation has been seen as legally problematic, and the
federal judges of the Northern District of California have struggled to
characterize it within the “on/off” toggle of employee status. 36 As some
have noted, with Uber some of the factors in the control test point toward
an employee relationship while others are reminiscent of an independent
contractor relationship. 37 On the one hand, crowdworkers have some
flexibility to set their own schedules and can sign on and off the app more
readily than do real workers in a traditional environment who work a set
shift or who are otherwise tethered to a workplace desk or factory floor.
Crowdworkers also use their own cellular telephones, computer
equipment, Internet connections, and other instrumentalities. Further,
EULAs contractually label crowdworkers as “independent contractors.”
On the other hand, many factors lean toward an employment
relationship. Control may be high, given that companies like Uber use
customer ratings to maintain almost a constant surveillance over workers,
with consumers deputized to manage the workforce. Many on-demand
companies spend a great deal of time and effort to implement quality
control policies. With low skilled crowdwork, the opportunity for
entrepreneurship, and with it risk-and-reward, is barely, if at all, present.
The terminology in a EULA is far from dispositive, as such online
contracts are known to be extremely one-sided and are construed against
the drafter. The possibility for exploitation is high, and low-skilled
workers are those that are most in need of FLSA protection.
All of this has left the judges in the Northern District of California
34

Stone, supra note [ ] at 257-58.
Richard R. Carlson, Why the Law Still Can't Tell an Employee When It Sees One and How It Ought to
Stop Trying, 22 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 295, 298 (2001) (“Indeed, in the case of employee status, the law
encourages ambiguity. On the one hand, employers often crave the control they enjoy in a normal employment
relationship. On the other, the advantages (to employers) of employing workers who are plausibly not employees
motivate a good deal of arbitrary and questionable “non-employee” classification. It is not uncommon to find
employees and putative contractors sitting side by side, performing the same work without any immediately
visible distinguishing characteristics.13 And the trend of the working world is toward greater complexity and
variation, driven partly by the temptation to capitalize on the fog that obscures the essence of many working
relationships.”)
36
Again, this has been a longstanding problem. See, e.g. Alan Hyde, Employment Law After the Death of
Employment, 1 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 99, 101 (1998) (“The new ways of working, that I believe challenge
normal legal analyses, include such new relations of employment as temporary employment placed by an agency
and part-time employment rendered by people who have no other employer but are treated as contingent workers
without benefits or implicit promises. They also include ways of working that are not, technically, “employment”
relations under any statute: independent contractors, free-lancers, consultants, and people out of the labor market
after downsizing or other elimination of former career jobs.”).
37
Means & Seiner, supra note [ ]. Brishen Rodgers
35
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with a malleable test and an indeterminate legal outcome. Perhaps Judge
Vince Chhabria said it best when he noted in ruling on a motion that “the
jury … will be handed a square peg and asked to choose between two
round holes. The test the California courts have developed over the 20th
Century for classifying workers isn’t very helpful in addressing this 21st
Century problem . . .” 38
The case Judge Chhabria was hearing was Cotter v. Lyft. The case
settled on January 27, 2016, with Lyft paying a settlement of $12 million
to its drivers. In addition, the company agreed to provide drivers with
additional due process rights before termination. As is the case with many
settlements, it was a compromise for both sides. While workers did not
get the employee status they had been seeking, they did at least receive
some compensation and can no longer be “deactivated” from their
accounts without going through a grievance process heard by an arbitrator.
Although Lyft may have dodged liability based on employee status in this
case, that is no guarantee that the Internal Revenue Service or another
governmental regulator will reach the same conclusion, despite the
settlement. 39
Because the case was settled, there is no precedential
effect; and as of now O’Connor v. Uber is set for trial in June of 2016.
Given Uber’s aggressive legal stance in the past and their unwillingness to
pay drivers benefits, they seem poised to go forward with the trial.
While the ridesharing cases are definitely the most high-profile in
terms of media coverage and sheer number of workers, there are many
other lawsuits pending within the on-demand economy that go far beyond
ridesharing. One arbitrary, but easy, way to start is alphabetically with
the top of the list, remarking upon common aspects and insights among
the cases included.
Table 1. On-Demand Economy Litigation

Casename
Agruss v.
Homejoy

38

Case No.

1:15-cv-00767

Jurisdiction

Gravamen of
Litigation

Status

N.D. Ill.

FLSA; Home
handyperson
services

Class claims
dismissed without
prejudice on
05/05/2015;

Cotter v. Lyft, No. 13-cv-04065-VC, *19 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 11, 2015).
For an example of a tax case where liability was also imposed by the IRS for employee
misclassification, see Vizcaino v. Microsoft, 97 F.3d 1187 (9th Cir. 1996)
39
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Homejoy ceased
operations.

Shardae
Bennett v.
Wash.Io,
Inc.

Cobarruviaz
v. Maplebear

BC603067

3:15-cv-00697EMC

CA
Superior
Court - Los
Angeles
County

Violation of Cal.
Labor Code
Sect. 226.8

N.D. Cal.

FLSA; Grocery
delivery service
app

N.D. Cal.

Employee
benefits, cost
reimbursements;
Ridesharing/driv
er app

N.D. Cal.

Employee
benefits, cost
reimbursements;
Ridesharing/
driver app

N.D. Cal.

Unjust
enrichment /
Restitution for
time spent
writing online
reviews

2015 WL 694112

Cotter v.
Lyft

Ehret v.
Uber

Jeung et al.
v. Yelp

3:13-cv-04065VC

3:14-cv-00113EMC
68 F.Supp.3d
1121
3:15-cv-02228RS
2015 WL
4776424

Class Action
Complaint filed
12/8/2015. No
response filed to
date.
Court granted
Instacart' s
(Maplebear' s)
motion to compel
arbitration on an
individual basis
granted except for
the Private
Attorney General
(PAGA)
representative
claim.
Settlement
agreement for $12
million agreed to
on 1/27/16. Due
process rights on
termination also
granted as part of
settlement.
Motion to Certify
Class &
Consolidate Cases
granted 10/22/15;
Case management
conference set for
1/28/16.

Case dismissed on
9/29/15.

18-Feb-16]
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FLSA; Grocery
delivery service
app

Individual claims
sent to arbitration;
Awaiting further
briefing on
Plaintiff’s PAGA
claims.

N.D. Cal.

Employee
benefits, cost
reimbursements;
Ridesharing/
driver app

Class Certification
& Motion to
Consolidate Cases
granted 10/22/15;
Defendant’s
motion to compel
arbitration denied

3:15-cv-01285
Levin v. Try
Caviar

Mohamed v.
Uber, a/k/a
In Re Uber
FCRA
Litigation

2015 WL
7529649
3:14-cv-05200EMC
Consolidated
with
14-cv-05241EMC
15-cv-03009EMC

9

N.D. Cal.

109 F.Supp.3d
1185

O' Connor v.
Uber

3:13-cv-03826EMC

N.D. Cal.

Employee
benefits, Cost
reimbursements;
Overtime under
FSLA;
Ridesharing/
Driver app

Otey v.
Crowdflower

3:12-cv-05524JST

N.D. Cal.

FLSA;
Crowdwork

N.D. Cal.

FLSA or Unjust
Enrichment /
Word
transcription
("Captchas") or
identification for

Rojas-Lozano
v. Google,
Inc.

3:15-cv-03751JSC
2015 WL
4779245

Class certified and
trial was set for
June, 2016; Uber
is appealing ruling
on new mandatory
arbitration clause
inserted to driver
contracts.
Settlement
agreement
approved by the
Court. Parties
now seeking to
amend the
settlement; Court
denied Motion to
Modify.
Motion to Dismiss
filed by Google
heard 12/15;
Court has
requested
supplemental

10
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Google Earth
(without pay)

Sherry Singer
et al v.
Postmates,
Inc.

Andrew Tan
v. Grubhub,
Inc.

Zenelaj et al.
v.
Handybook,
Inc.

4:15-cv-01284
JSW

3:15-cv-05128

U.S.
District
Court
California
Northern
District

Violation of
FLSA and Cal.
Labor Code
Sect. 226.8 et
seq.

N.D. Cal.

Violation of Cal.
Labor Code;
Restaurant/Food
delivery
website/app

N.D. Cal.

FLSA; Home
handyperson
services

3:14-cv-05449THE
109 F.Supp.3d
125

[18-Feb-16
briefing.

Class Action
Complaint filed
3/19/2015.
Motion for Partial
Summ. Judgment
filed by Defendant
6/2015
Removed from
state court. First
Amended
Complaint filed
12/15/16.
Parties mediated
the dispute
without success.
Case is headed
toward
arbitration.

The first case listed is Arguss v. Homejoy, 40 a case in which
workers sued a home repair services app for minimum wage violations
under the FLSA. The case was dismissed on May 5, 2015 as Homejoy had
filed for bankruptcy and then subsequently ceased operations. 41 Boosters
of the on-demand economy were quick to blame Homejoy’s failure on the
actions of the workers, in particular their decision to bring a lawsuit. 42
Many prognosticators used this case as a way to raise the salience of these
employment litigations, noting that increased labor costs might result in
the demise of existing companies and retard the growth of new on-demand
40

Agruss v. Homejoy, 1:15-cv-00767 (N.D.Ill. Mar. 5, 2015).
Daniel D’Addario, Homejoy Cleaning Company Shuts Down, TIME, July 18, 2015, available at
http://time.com/3963565/homejoy-cleaning-shuts-down/
42
Kia Kokalitheva, Startup Homejoy Bites the Dust – Literally, FORTUNE, July 17, 2015, available at
http://fortune.com/2015/07/17/homejoy-closing-cleaning-google/ (noting lack of venture funding for company
as well as labor lawsuit woes); Sarah Kessler, The Gig Economy Won’t Last Because It’s Being Sued to Death,
FAST COMPANY (Feb. 17, 2015), http://www.fastcompany.com/3042248/the-gig-economy-wont-last-becauseits-being-sued-to-death.
41
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apps. 43
The rhetoric that Homejoy failed because its workers sued for
minimum wage and overtime protections failed to establish a key element:
causality. While labor unrest is certainly not good for business, it is not
clear that paying workers minimum wage was the cause of Homejoy’s
bankruptcy filings. In fact, Homejoy’s business model was in financial
trouble before the company’s legal troubles began, because the company
overextended itself chasing new customers on bargain websites like
Groupon. 44 Homejoy then could not retain customers and suffered from
quality control issues. 45 As such, it would be overblown to conclude from
only this one isolated example that paying workers minimum wage would
mean the immediate bankruptcy of the on demand economy. Some have
claimed that perhaps these new businesses should receive an exemption
from minimum wage either because they are involved in sharing or
because they involve new jobs. 46 Regardless, the argument that ondemand companies should somehow be exempt from minimum wage
because otherwise their business models and very existence would be at
risk is a problematic argument. In the United States, the requirement of a
minimum wage was established as a response to downward wage spirals in
the Great Depression. 47 Wage and hour laws are requirements of general
applicability to all businesses; and it is difficult to see why they would not
apply to on-demand economy companies. 48
Indeed, many of the “sharing” companies of yesteryear have
moved away from “sharing” and in fact are fully for-profit businesses
pursuing a shareholder value maximization model at all costs, often driven
by the demands of their venture capitalist investors. In addition, even
true non-profits must pay minimum wage to their regular employees.
And, while cell phone apps and online markets for work may be new, the
43
Carmel DeAmicis, Homejoy Shuts Down After Battling Worker Classification Lawsuits, RE/ CODE, July
17, 2015, available at http://recode.net/2015/07/17/cleaning-services-startup-homejoy-shuts-down-afterbattling-worker-classification-lawsuits/ (interview with co-founder of Homejoy blaming misclassification
lawsuits and legal woes for company’s shutdown)
44
Ellen Huet, What Really Killed Homejoy? It Couldn’t Hold on to its Customers, FORBES, Jul. 23, 2015
available at http://www.forbes.com/sites/ellenhuet/2015/07/23/what-really-killed-homejoy-it-couldnt-hold-ontoits-customers/#764ce4f5114c (“Former employees [stated that]… the startup pushed relentlessly for high growth
numbers instead of fixing its poor retention rates, which persisted both because Homejoy relied too heavily on
deal sites like Groupon for new customers and failed to improve its core service because it couldn’t train its
independent contractor cleaners.”).
45
Id. Of course, a lack of control, quality or otherwise, is a problem when using independent contractors
who truly are independent.
46
Seth Harris & Alan Kreuger, A Proposal for Modernizing Labor Law for Twenty-First Century Work:
The “Independent Worker,” THE HAMILTON PROJECT, Discussion Paper 2015-10 (Dec. 2015), available at
http://www.hamiltonproject.org/assets/files/modernizing_labor_laws_for_twenty_first_century_work_krueger_h
arris.pdf.
47
See Cherry, A Minimum Wage for Crowdwork, supra note [ ].
48
Id.
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roles of driver, cleaner, and errand runner are well-established. The tasks
that these workers perform are by no means new jobs, even if those jobs
are enabled, enhanced, or made more efficient by technology.
The Zenalaj v. Handybook case (last alphabetically but similar in
business and work tasks to Homejoy) involves a similar dispute over
misclassification for housecleaners booked through cell phone apps. 49
Handybook, which goes about its business as “Handy,” is being sued by
workers for alleged wage and hour violations under the FLSA.
Interestingly, at this point the case predominantly involves the question of
whether these worker complaints are appropriate to be heard in
arbitration. 50 Increasingly, this has become an issue throughout the
economy as many employers (as well as website operators and stores)
attempt to minimize liability though mandatory pre-dispute arbitration
clauses in form contracts or EULAs. 51 In this case, the court was inclined
to enforce these arbitration provisions. 52 As of this writing, the workers
were entering mediations with the company to try to resolve the issues. 53
The next case, Bennett v. Washio involves an alleged state labor
law violation for a dry-cleaning delivery service. I group this litigation
along with Tan v. Grubhub54and Singer v. Postmates, both cases involving
restaurant delivery services. A similar case is pending against Instacart, a
49

Zenalaj v. Handybook, 109 F.Supp.3d 125 (2015).
Id.
51
While not the main topic of this article, a longstanding trend has been the growth of these arbitration
provisions and courts’ willingness to enforce them, even when they seem one-sided and the product of
adhesion contracts. For an old look at many of the arbitration issues as they appeared in 1998, see Miriam A.
Cherry, Note, Not-So-Arbitrary Arbitration, 21 HARVARD WOMEN’S L. J. 267 (1998). For more updated and
recent accounts of the movement toward arbitration as a way of managing workplace liability for employers,
see Jean R. Sternlight, Disarming Employees How American Employers Are Using Mandatory Arbitration to
Deprive Workers of Legal Protection, 80 BROOK. L. REV. 1309, 1310 (2015) (“Today employers, with
substantial assistance from the Supreme Court, are using mandatory arbitration clauses to “disarm” employees,
effectively preventing them from bringing most individual or class claims and thereby obtaining access to justice.
It has been estimated that roughly 20% of the non-unionized American workforce is covered by mandatory
arbitration provisions, and this number may well increase.”) For more on arbitration as a method of containing
costs toward consumers, see Theodore Eisenberg et. al., Arbitration's Summer Soldiers: An Empirical Study of
Arbitration Clauses in Consumer and Nonconsumer Contracts, 41 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 871 (2008) (“We
provide the first study of varying use of arbitration clauses across contracts within the same firms. Using a
sample of 26 consumer contracts and 164 nonconsumer contracts from large public corporations, we compared
the use of arbitration clauses in firms' consumer and nonconsumer contracts. Over three-quarters of the consumer
agreements provided for mandatory arbitration but less than 10% of the firms' material nonconsumer,
nonemployment contracts included arbitration clauses. The absence of arbitration provisions in the vast majority
of material contracts suggests that, ex ante, many firms value, even prefer, litigation over arbitration to resolve
disputes with peers. Our data suggest that the frequent use of arbitration clauses in the same firms' consumer
contracts may be an effort to preclude aggregate consumer action rather than, as often claimed, an effort to
promote fair and efficient dispute resolution.”); But see Christopher Drahozal & Stephen J. Ware, Why Do
Businesses Use (or not Use) Arbitration Clauses?, 25 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 433, 433-4 (2010).
52
Zenalaj v. Handybook, 109 F.Supp.3d 125 (2015). A court’s decision to enforce an arbitration
agreement will be influenced by many factors under state law, and that analysis is largely beyond the scope of
the present article.
53
Id.
54
Tan v. Grubhub, 3:15-cv-05128 (N.D. Cal. 2015).
50
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grocery delivery service. The Instacart case is styled as Cobarruviaz v.
Maplebear. 55 Interestingly, in response to this litigation and the attention
that it received, Instacart made the decision to reclassify its grocery
shoppers as employees. 56 The reasoning from the company was that
employee classification would allow for stability in its workforce, as well
as allow for training and quality control. 57 Instacart noted that choosing
groceries actually took skill, and if the company was to make an
investment in training, they wanted those trained workers remaining with
the company. 58 Even though that litigation is still pending, one assumes
that on a going-forward basis, the issue of which workers are independent
contractors and which are employees will be a moot point.
Continuing with the list, a case that was of interest but was then
dismissed was Jeung v. Yelp. 59 The Yelp site exists for the purpose of
rating everything commercial – restaurants, bars, hotels, car dealerships –
and anyone who is a Yelp member can write a review, variously praising
or ranting about the service received, value for the money, or any other
aspect of the business that they deem relevant, subject to certain
guidelines. 60 While many people treat writing Yelp reviews as an
occasional pastime, or something to do only in the event of truly awful or
outstanding service, others spend a considerable amount of time on the
site. In fact, some reviewers become so well-known that others rely on
them for advice and recommendations. While Yelp does not pay for
reviews, these types of active content-contributors help it build value on
its site. Therefore over the years, Yelp has sought to encourage loyalty
among its most active and well-respected reviewers by awarding them
“Elite” status along with certain perks. 61
The plaintiffs in Jeung v. Yelp case alleged that they were entitled
to minimum wage for time spent writing customer reviews on the Yelp
website. In the alternative, the plaintiffs argued that they should be
entitled to recover in unjust enrichment for restitution. 62 After all, Yelp
55

Cobarruviaz v. Maplebear, 2015 WL 694112 (N.D. Cal. 2015).
Sara Ashley O’Brien, The Uber Effect: Instacart Shifts away from Contract Workers, CNN MONEY
(New
York),
June
22,
2015,
http://money.cnn.com/2015/06/22/technology/
instacart-employee-option/
57
Davey Alba, Instacart Shoppers Can Now Choose to be Real Employees, WIRED, Jun. 22, 2015,
available at http://www.wired.com/2015/06/instacart-shoppers-can-now-choose-real-employees/ (discussing
reasons that company made the switch to part-time employees, which included training and quality control).
58
Id.
59
Jeung v. Yelp, 2015 WL 4776424 (N.D. Cal. 2015).
60
www.yelp.com
61
Lydia O’Connor, Yelp Reviewers File Class Action Lawsuit Claiming They are Unpaid Writers, THE
HUFFINGTON POST, Oct. 31, 2013 available at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/10/30/yelp-lawsuit_n_4179663.html.
62
Also known as an action in quasi-contract or quantum meruit, unjust enrichment is an alternative to
contract theory. Here, there was no express contract between Yelp and the reviewers, but under an unjust
56
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would hardly be a valuable site without the content written by its crowd of
users. Finally, the plaintiffs argued that they had been injured when their
status as “Elite” reviewers was taken away from them and when their
accounts were deactivated. However, on June 19, 2015, Jeung v. Yelp
was dismissed. The court characterized the dismissal as essentially a
default judgement. Plaintiffs’ counsel had filed some questionable and
bizarre filings before abandoning the case. 63
Another case about unpaid work on the Internet is Rojas-Lazano v.
Google. 64 Here, plaintiffs sued Google for the value of work done on an
unpaid basis for Google without knowledge. How could someone work
without being aware of it? Most Internet users are familiar with the
process during posting a comment on a web blog or signing up for a
mailing list where they are asked to input a code of letters and numbers to
establish that they are a real person, and not an automated program (or
“bot”). The codes that websites ask users to input are known as
“captchas” or “recaptchas.” The plaintiffs in this case argued that when
they were inputting these captchas to verify that they weren’t bots, they
were also working for Google.
Google had been putting small bits of transcription work (for books
or Google Earth) up on the web through the vehicle of the captchas.
While filling out a captcha only took a few seconds, as millions of people
posted comments on blogs or signed up for a website, in the aggregate this
added up to quite an outstanding amount of time. Most people just
thought they were establishing personhood, and even after the lawsuit,
most people do not know that they are actually generating profit for
Google every time they enter a captcha. However, as the plaintiffs in
Yeung v. Yelp found out, the landscape for plaintiffs for these types of
unpaid online work, just based on what little existing precedent there is
unwelcoming.
A dispute over payment for blog posts illustrates the unfriendly
reception such cases have received in the courts. The case involved the
Huffington Post, a popular weblog that serves as a forum for current news
events and left-leaning political commentary. 65 Leading up to the 2008
enrichment theory, no agreement is necessary. It is enough if a benefit was conferred, there was an appreciation
of the benefit, and then acceptance and retention of the benefit. For more generally on unjust enrichment, see
e.g. See, e.g. Caprice Roberts, Restitutionary Disgorgement as a Moral Compass of Breach of Contract, 77 U.
CINN. L. REV. 991 (2009); Caprice Roberts, A Commonwealth of Perspective on Restitutionary Disgorgement
for Breach of Contract, 65 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 945 (2008).
63
Eric Goldman, Court Says Yelp Reviewers Aren’t Employees, FORBES, Aug. 17 2015, available at
http://www.forbes.com/sites/ericgoldman/2015/08/17/court-says-yelp-reviewers-arentemployees/#512432103fec.
64
Rojas-Lazano v. Google, 2015 WL 4779245 (N.D. Cal. 2015).
65
www.huffingtonpost.com.
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election, many Huffington Post bloggers wrote accounts critical of thenPresident George W. Bush, specifically his administration’s treatment of
the Guantanamo Bay prisoners, while others wrote to assist fellow
Democratic voters to become more familiar with the primary candidates. 66
Regardless of one’s personal political leanings, what is certain is that the
website was able to attract a relatively sophisticated level of writing in its
posts. 67 The featured authors included professional journalists and
attorneys who contributed their efforts to the Huffington Post for free,
despite normally being paid for their writing. Freshly updated content
helped attract an additional audience to the blog, which grew rapidly,
reaching 15 million hits per weekday. 68
In March 2011 media giant AOL submitted a $315 million
acquisition bid for the Huffington Post. 69 The web traffic that was driven
to the HuffPo website was valuable to AOL, a company that had been
searching both for more content providers and an expanded audience for
existing content. Arianna Huffington and her financial backers stood to
make a handsome profit from the acquisition. The bloggers, on the other
hand, who had built the blog’s readership by dint of their hard work, were
to receive nothing. 70 Frustrated, Jonathan Tasini, a journalist and labor
activist, 71 along with other unpaid bloggers, filed a lawsuit challenging the
terms of the deal. 72 The bloggers claimed that as their hard work had built
the blog’s value, they therefore deserved a share of the profits, either
through a contract claim or a claim for unjust enrichment and restitution. 73
66

See e.g. Shayana Kadidal, Guantanamo, Six Years Later, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 11, 2008)
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/shayana-kadidal/guantanamo-six-years-late_b_81025.html; For the Huffington
Post’s current stance on this issue, see Ben Fox, Guantanamo Closure Hopes Fade as Prison Turns Ten,
HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 10, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/01/10/guantanamo-closureanniversary_n_1195984.html.
67
See Paul Farhi, Freelancer to File Class-Action Suit Against HuffPo and AOL Over Compensation,
WASHINGTONPOST. COM (Apr. 12, 2011), http://www.washingtonpost.com/lifesytle/style/freelancer-to-fileclass-action-suit-aainst-huffpost-and-aol-over-compensation/2011/04/12/AFa9QGQD_story.html.
68
Nate Silver, The Economics of Blogging and the Huffington Post, NYTIMES. COM (Feb. 12, 2011),
http://fivethirtyeight.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/02/12/the-economics-of-blogging-and-the-huffington-post/
(estimating 15 million page hits per weekday on HuffPo and analyzing types of posts and attention they
typically were attracting).
69
Id. See also Julianne Pepitone, Huffington Post blogger sues AOL for $105 million, CNNMONEY. COM
(Apr. 12, 2011), http://money.cnn.com/2011/04/12/technology/huffington_post_blogger_lawsuit/index.htm.
70
Jeff Berovici, AOL, Arianna Huffington Hit with Class Action Suit, F ORBES. COM (April 12, 2011),
available at http://www.forbes.com/sites/jeffbercovici/2011/04/12/aol-arianna-huffington-hit-with-class-actionsuit/. See also Tim Rutten, AOL? HuffPo. The Loser? Journalism, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 9, 2011, available at
http://articles.latimes.com/2011/feb/09/opinion/la-oe-rutten-column-huffington-aol-20110209 (“To grasp its
business model… you need to picture a galley rowed by slaves and commanded by pirates.”).
71
Jonathan Tasini was previous the successful lead plaintiff in a lawsuit challenging the rights of
newspapers to license the work of freelance writers to electronic databases without additional compensation.
See New York Times Co. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483 (2001) (ruling in favor of freelance writers).
72
See Tasini v. AOL Inc., Class Action Complaint, 11 CV 2472 (April 12, 2011) (SDNY).
73
The claim would be that, although a formal contract was lacking, the organizers of the Huffington Post
were unjustly enriched and a restitution theory would be applied to compensate the bloggers. Do Huffington
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The heart of the Huffington Post bloggers’ claims seemed to rest,
as many contract disputes do, in the differing expectations that the parties
brought with them to the deal. From the bloggers’ perspective, they
performed work without payment because they believed that they were
contributing to a political website that advanced the causes in which they
believed. Retroactively, they learned that the founders of the website
were to profit from the Huffington Post, and they therefore felt taken
advantage of by the organizers. 74 On the other hand, the Huffington Post
claimed that the bloggers did receive a substantial benefit, as they used the
HuffPo “to connect and help their work be seen by as many people as
possible. It’s the same reason people go on TV shows: to promote their
views and ideas.” 75 In other words, according to the HuffPo, the blog
provided unknown writers with an important benefit: a platform for
expression and free publicity to a growing audience. 76
The District
Court sided with the HuffPo and dismissed the bloggers’ complaint, which
was then affirmed by the Second Circuit. 77 Perhaps as a delayed reaction,
the Huffington Post writers unionized in January 2016. 78
The last case for discussion in this section is Otey v. Crowdflower. 79
Crowdflower is a crowdworking platform that hired thousands of workers
both in the US and globally to carry out small micro-tasks. Unlike Uber,
which involves a platform matching up a driver who is performing a
service in the real world, Otey involved work performed solely on
computer. In this type of crowdwork, large tasks such as constructing a
website is broken down into its constituent parts such as coding, tagging,
and describing items or pictures. 80 Platforms then farm out these microtasks to hundreds or thousands of individual workers across the world.
After completion the tasks are then re-aggregated and compiled to finish
the job. Workers sued Crowdflower for failure to pay minimum wage
under the FLSA and Oregon’s minimum wage law. The workers’
allegations were coextensive with media coverage describing the poor
Post
Bloggers
Deserve
to
Get
Paid?,
LAW
BLOG,
WSJ. COM,
available
at
http://blogs.wsj.com/digits/2011/04/12/should-huffington-post-bloggers-get-paid/tab/print/.
74
The unpaid bloggers posted on the Twitter account #huffpuff, claiming that the HuffPo “built a blogempire on the backs of thousands of citizen journalists.”
75
Jeremy W. Peters, Huffington Post Is Target of Suit on Behalf of Bloggers, NYTIMES. COM (Apr. 12,
2011), available at http://mediadecoder.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/04/12/huffington-post-is-target-of-suit-onbehalf-of-bloggers/?pagemode= print.
76
Id. For academic commentary discussing the rise of amateurism and peer production of blogs, see, e.g.
John Quiggen & Dan Hunter, Money Ruins Everything, 30 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L. J. 203, 220 (2008).
77
Tasini v. AOL, Inc., F.Supp.2d 734, 745 (S.D.N.Y. 2012), aff’d No. 12-1428-cv, 2012 WL 61766559
at *1 (2nd Cir. Dec. 12, 2012).
78
Frank Pallotta, Huffington Post Becomes Biggest Unionized Digital Media Outlet, CNN MONEY, Jan.
14, 2016, available at http://money.cnn.com/2016/01/14/media/huffington-post-union/index.html
79
Otey v. Crowdflower, 3:12-cv-05524-JST (N.D. Cal. 2013).
80
See Randall Stross, When the Assembly Line Moves Online, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 30, 2010.
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wages of crowdwork. 81 Crowdflower unsurprisingly argued that these
platform workers were independent contractors, not employees.
Before the issue could be decided, however, the case moved into
settlement negotiations. During the first round of negotiations, the parties
reached an agreement by which Crowdflower would compensate for the
difference between what workers were paid and the statutory minimum
wage. They also agreed to pay for attorney’s fees and to cease operations
as a crowdwork platform for a period of ten years. Judge Tigar, however,
rejected the settlement as inadequate. The revised settlement increased the
amount of monetary compensation for plaintiffs, including administrative
costs and attorney’s fees to $585,507, but contained no ban on
Crowdflower continuing to broker crowdwork.
The monetary settlement in the Crowdflower case surely encouraged
other plaintiffs and their attorneys to bring suit. How were the plaintiffs
in this case able to succeed in brokering the settlement? Their success can
likely be traced back to the statements of Crowdflower’s CEO. Although
the videos referenced in the complaint have been taken off YouTube, the
complaint alleged that these videos had the CEO noting that he did not
have to pay workers minimum wage. In an interview with the BBC the
record of which is still available online, the CEO stated that “we almost
trick the game players into doing something useful for the world while
playing these games. Just do ten minutes of real work that a real company
can use, and we’ll give you a virtual tractor. That way everyone wins.” 82
Altogether, that would establish a willing violation of the minimum wage
laws. Such a knowing and intentional violation that would then be
established could result in treble damages. It is entirely viable to suggest
that Crowdflower did not want to risk such a result; at various points in
the litigation it pled poverty and noted that paying workers minimum wage
would bankrupt the company. Ironically, Crowdflower received a large
venture capital investment only a short time after the settlement.
Having reviewed the cases listed from the chart, note that there are
a number of remarkable commonalities. The vast majority of the litigation
81
See, e.g. Alyson Shontell, My Nightmare Experience as a Task Rabbit Drone, BUSINESS INSIDER, Dec.
7, 2011, available at http://www.businessinsider.com/confessions-of-a-task-rabbit-2011-12 (noting no guarantee
of minimum wage); Moshe Z. Marvit, How Crowdworkers Became the Ghosts in the Digital Machine, THE
NATION, Feb. 24, 2014, available at http://www.thenation.com/article/178241/how-crowdworkers-becameghosts-digital-machine (recounting stories of two workers on AMT who earned less than minimum wage);
Randall Stross, When the Assembly Line Moves Online, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 30, 2010 available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/31/business/31digi.html; Matthew Bingham & Joseph Dunn, Wanted: Digital
Drones to Earn ½ p an Hour, SUNDAY TIMES (U.K.), Jan. 11, 2009 (journalists performing tasks on the
Amazon Mechanical Turk and earning a little over $2 for four hour’s work).
82
Fiona Graham, Crowdsourcing Work: Labour on Demand or Digital Sweatshop?, BBC NEWS, Oct. 22,
2010, available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/mobile/business-11600902.
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is taking place in federal court, in the Northern district of California.
There are several reasons for this geographic anomaly. First, the Bay
Area is the natural testing ground for many of the start-up businesses in
the on-demand economy. With its close proximity to Silicon Valley,
many of the platforms use the neighborhood near them in order to
experiment and build their brands. The other point about this, however, is
that California also has enacted generally plaintiff-friendly labor laws. 83
This makes California an attractive jurisdiction for plaintiffs to file class
actions. These cases are important to watch because there is a “first
mover” effect. There is no precedential value from one case to another,
or even from one district or circuit to another. When faced with a
difficult and new fact pattern, however, judges often try to learn from and
rely on the work done by the courts that have already put in the time and
effort to resolve the dispute in the first instance. 84
The chart excludes decisions by administrative entities.
These
85
mostly have dealt with individual state law claims. Other issues that did
not quite make it onto the chart but are important nonetheless are Uber’s
widespread lobbying in various states to have its workers continue as
independent contractors. In fact, Uber has pressed state legislators to pass
“model codes” for the regulation of on-demand transportation companies.
While such codes make sense from the perspective of wanting drivers to
have insurance and minimum licensing requirements, Uber has sneakily
inserted provisions about labor laws.
Uber’s model transportation
legislation contains language that says its workers are independent
contractors. Aside from indicating industry capture, such legislation may
not have much meaning for worker status. For each statute (e.g. FLSA,
unemployment, worker’s compensation) has its own individual definition
of employee elaborated by the courts. Having another definition randomly
inserted in the transportation code will likely not be dispositive of the
issue, despite Uber’s efforts.
At the time of this writing, no clear consensus has emerged on how
the courts will determine employee versus independent contractor status
for workers in the on-demand economy. As noted above, the legal tests
for discerning such status are largely malleable and based on past
83

See, e.g. Alan Hyde, High Velocity Labor Market.
The Uber case thus literally becomes the Uber case.
85
The California Labor Commission made headlines in ruling that Uber driver Barbara Berwick was an
employee and thus entitled to reimbursement for certain work-related expenses. Berwick v. Uber Techs., Inc.,
No. 11-46739 EK (Cal. 2015), available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/268980201/Uber-v-Berwick-CaliforniaLabor-Commission-Ruling#scribd. Other administrative bodies have been split, with a Florida administrative
decision that an Uber drive was an independent contractor. See Davey Alba, Florida Says Uber Driver Isn’t an
Employee After All, WIRED, Oct. 1, 2016, available at http://www.wired.com/2015/10/florida-uber-decisionreversal/.
84
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precedent, largely indeterminate. It is only after we pass the threshold
questions of whether these workers are employees that we will get to some
of the more substantive regulatory issues. Crowdwork litigation is
important because it ties into vexing meta-questions about the future of
work. The next section explores these larger concerns.
II. THE ON-DEMAND ECONOMY AND THE
DIGITAL TRANSFORMATION OF WORK
The previous section provided an update on litigation in the ondemand economy. Apart from the issues being explored in the cases,
(most of which are still in their early stages), it is important to take a step
back and examine the larger context of how work is changing with
respone to technology. The framework for the discussion in this section
relies upon Katherine Van Wezel Stone’s book From Widgets to Digits. 86
I propose adding the category of “crowdwork” to the model of industrial
and digital work that Stone articulates.
Stone’s book describes the changing landscape of work toward the
end of the millennium. 87 As she notes, the United States has been in the
process of moving from an industrial, manufacturing-based economy to a
knowledge-based one. 88 The old manufacturing economy was
characterized by the “life cycle” model of employment. 89 Promotion
throughout a career was achieved through vertical job ladders and was
structured hierarchically. 90 Original thought and creativity were largely
downplayed. In the manufacturing economy jobs were often broken down
into their constituent parts, and job training was not important, nor
expected. Loyalty and longevity, however, were prized traits as they
helped to manage the workforce, and workers were rewarded with benefits
that depended on longevity. Unions were an expected representation of
stable, long-term employee interests.
The known characteristics of the industrial system owed much to
earlier theorizing about how best to maximize the productivity of workers.
Apart from the notion of the invisible hand, Adam Smith wrote of the
division of labor among pin makers as a method of increasing production.
91 Frederick Taylor further refined the deconstruction of work through
86

See generally KATHERINE V.W. STONE, FROM WIDGETS TO DIGITS (2004).
KATHERINE V.W. STONE, FROM WIDGETS TO DIGITS 67-77 (2004) (describing major changes and shifts
in the economy as there is a transition in the U.S. away from manufacturing jobs).
88
Id.
89
Id. at 54-55.
90
Id. at 60.
91
ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS, ch. 1 (“To take an example, therefore, from a very trifling
87
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so-called scientific management. 92 So-called “Taylorism” sought to
calibrate each worker’s actions to achieve the highest level of efficiency. 93
The assembly lines and social welfare policies of Ford Motor Company
took these principles into account. Ford wanted a stable and loyal
workforce, and in order to get that, he had to pay higher wages to those
performing repetitious and occasionally hazardous tasks. 94
The shift to a knowledge-based, information-rich economy at the
end of the millennium also engendered a shift to a new model of work. 95
Some of the characteristics of the new digital work described by Stone are
an increased emphasis on worker knowledge, training and skills. The
digital era, as Stone defines, refers to mid to late 20th century, when
computers and the internet became “the central nervous system of global
production networks.” 96 Based on a shift towards fluid workplaces and
permeable borders between firms, the digital model places a high value on
the intellectual capital of employees. 97
Gone was the idea of a “life
cycle” model of employment. Instead, workers had shorter job tenure,
and were expected to advance by moving horizontally across different
firms. 98 Worker loyalty, having been eroded by mass layoffs and
movement of manufacturing jobs overseas in the 1980s, was instead
replaced by the notion of “employability.” 99 Rather than seeking the
elusive idea of job security, workers instead focused on increasing their
job skills and remaining competitive within the market external to the
firm.
Other characteristics of this new digital model included the
flattening of organizations and subtracting middle management. As
workers are hired for their knowledge and expertise, their employment
often was centered around a certain project or projects. 100 While
employment might not last beyond a particular project, workers were
often promised opportunities to enhance their skills to provide motivation.
manufacture; but one in which the division of labour has been very often taken notice of, the trade of the pinmaker; a workman not educated to this business (which the division of labour has rendered a distinct trade), nor
acquainted with the use of the machinery employed in it (to the invention of which the same division of labour has
probably given occasion), could scarce, perhaps, with his utmost industry, make one pin in a day, and certainly
could not make twenty. But in the way in which this business is now carried on, not only the whole work is a
peculiar trade, but it is divided into a number of branches, of which the greater part are likewise peculiar trades.
92
See generally FREDERICK WINSLOW TAYLOR, PRINCIPLES OF SCIENTIFIC MANAGEMENT 31 (1911).
93
Stone, supra note [ ], at 34-36.
94
Dodge v. Ford Motor Company, 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919) (classic corporate law case discussing
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Some forms of these knowledge jobs will tout the ability to network with
others, increasing the chance of other horizontal job opportunities. Job
changes and moves are common in this new digital model of work. 101
The rest of Stone’s book centers on describing the ways in which the
traditional labor law model falls short in protecting the needs and rights of
worker in the new digital model. She especially calls for legal reform
around the issue of non-competition clauses, which prevent workers from
using their skills and their network for rival firms. 102
How does the recent development of crowdwork fit with the
industrial or digital model? Many would be quick to classify crowdwork
as another branch or outgrowth of the digital knowledge work model.
After all, crowdwork is intermediated by technology, whether that is by
cell phone app or via the Internet, and some forms of crowdwork take
place solely in cyberspace. Crowdwork takes place by the project,
indeed, with small gigs or microlabor on the Internet, workers are only
hired for one particular task, even if that task takes only seconds or
minutes. 103 The focus on work by the project also seems to be a
commonality between crowdwork and digital work. However, some
aspects of crowdworking look more like a throwback to the earlier
industrial model. In fact, the idea of breaking down tasks to their lowest
common denominator is nothing new – in fact it is paradigmatic
Taylorism. The analysis here is to focus on two features of crowdwork:
automatic management of workers through computer code coupled with
what has been termed “precarity.”
A salient feature of crowdwork infrastructure is the predominance
of code in mediating work relations. The literature refers to this process
as automatic management or “algocracy.” 104 Indeed, a new trend is that
algorithms are absorbing many organizational functions that managers
traditionally would perform. Computer code may perform a variety of
supervisory tasks from the mundane to the sophisticated: assigning tasks
to workers, speeding up work processes, determining the timing and
length of breaks, monitoring quality, ranking employee, and more. Code
makes crucial on-the-spot decisions about individualized employees and
what they need to be doing in real time. Labor practices that used to be
run through bureaucracy (and other organizational control regimes) are
becoming embedded within computer programs. Workers are directed by
101
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imperatives programmed into the algorithms, which replace the traditional
external schemes carried out by managers.
Amazon Mechanical Turk provides one example of such automatic
management. 105 Built into the code are easy filtering criteria for selection
of workers, performance assessment of their work, and the provision of
incentives, whether positive or negative. Significantly, communication
and dispute resolution are almost entirely absent from automatic
management systems. Communication and dispute resolution systems are
neither time nor cost-efficient for the employer. As noted by one task
assigner, “the time spent looking at the email costs more than what you
paid them [the worker]” 106
Uber also embraces the idea of automatic management. 107 Rather
than conduct background checks, having a dispatch system, or spot checks
by supervisors, Uber has essentially outsourced its quality control to its
passengers. 108 Upon the completion of a ride, passengers are asked to rate
their driver on a scale of one to five, with five stars as the best score. The
ratings are then averaged in order to provide a composite score. If a
driver has their customer satisfaction rating fall below a certain average,
they can no longer sign in to the app. They are essentially booted off
Uber and can no longer sign in. Currently the threshold for being cut off
is high, approximately 4.7 out of five stars. 109 Some have alleged that
these ratings could be reflecting racial or religious bias, whether conscious
or unconscious and are problematic as such. 110 In fact, the idea of the
automatic deactivation or “firing by algorithm” has proven to be so
unpopular with drivers that the recent Lyft settlement addressed it. One
major point of the settlement in Cotter v. Lyft was that drivers received the
right to an arbitration hearing before their dismissal. No longer can Lyft

105
Lily Irani & Six Silberman, Turkopticon: Interrupting Worker Invisibility in Amazon Mechanical Turk,
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dismiss workers by booting them from an app. 111
Understanding the growth of crowdwork also requires attention to
a second trend: the expansion of precarious labor. By “precarious,”
scholars are referring to labor that is more than just part-time and
temporary. The notion encompasses a deeper undercutting of reliability
and security in labor systems. Arne Kalleberg discusses precarious work
as work that is uncertain, unpredictable, and risky. 112 Stone also refers to
work that has no explicit promise of continuity. This notion of precarious
work spans the range of occupations. This degradation of labor is felt by
the full range of workers, from fast food service, to retail worker, to
engineering consultants.
Kalleberg charts dramatic trends.
Through precarious labor
systems, we are seeing an increasing likelihood of unemployment, a
growth of general job insecurity, expanding contingent and nonstandard
work, and risk-shifting (that is, the transfer of labor expenses like health
insurance and pensions from the employer to the employee). Impacts on
the daily lives of workers can be problematic. For working parents, the
rise of “just in time” scheduling means difficulty in arranging childcare.
Furthermore, precarious labor can put workers in a trap: while a
worker might need an extra job to survive, having a second job means that
the scheduling may get a worker fired from the first. 113 Precarious labor
has been particularly pernicious in service and retail jobs where women
and people of color predominate. However, one of the important markers
of precarious labor is how it is moving up the occupational ladder.
Increasingly, jobs in knowledge work and information are experience
precarity as well, which leads to our next point.
Micro labor is identified for its small scope, short duration, tiny
output, and limited remuneration. At the same time, it is characterized by
an opposing feature: massive scale. Employees doing tiny jobs are being
hired and aggregated in huge numbers. For employers, the gain is
substantial productivity out of legions of low-paid micro-workers. For
employees, however, their livelihoods are increasingly dependent on
searching and carrying out tiny tasks. Promises of micro labor are
enticing:
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The work will come to you, via apps on your smartphone, making
the process of finding work as easy as checking your Twitter feed.
Whatever you do, it will be your choice. Because you are no
longer just an employee with set hours and wages working to make
someone else rich. In the future, you will be your very own minibusiness. 114
Indeed, there are many advantages to crowdwork in terms of easy access,
quick turnaround, and flexible scheduling. 115
In fact, these trends in crowdwork represent a new phase in
employment. Table 2 illustrates the digital transformation of work more
completely.
Spinning off of the classic model of “industrial”
employment, the information society has spurred not just the one
additional stage, but a third, focused on crowdwork. This “crowdwork”
system of employment is focused on precariousness, completion of small
discrete tasks (microlabor) and promises of job flexibility.
Table 2. Transformation of Employment Systems:
Industrial, Digital, Crowdwork116

Industrial
Features of Job
Training
Structure of
Tasks
Location of Work

Duration of Work
Decision-Making

Authority
Relations

114

Employment Systems
Digital

Firm-Specific
Jobs, Narrowlydefined
Employer’s Office

General
Projects, Broadlydefined
Variable, Often the
Worker’s Home

Employee’s
Lifetime
Hierarchical
Supervision and
Evaluation
Top-Down,
Command and
Control

Weeks, Months,
Years
Peer Group

Bounded Discretion

Crowdwork
None
Tasks, Microdefined
Variable, Often
Online or the TaskPoster’s Home,
Office, Etc.
Hours, Minutes,
Seconds
Automatic
Management
Automatic
Management

Kessler at 2.
Indeed, Means & Seiner, supra note [ ] at FN [ ] comb through many company websites and reproduce
their promises of flexibility for workers. Unfortunately, Means & Seiner advocate only using flexibility to
determine independent contractor status without looking at the other side of the coin, i.e. precarious work.
116
Elements of the first two columns are adapted and elaborated from Stone, supra note [ ] at 114.
Column three is the author’s contribution.
115
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Security

Of Job

Of Employability
(i.e., gaining
portable skills for
future jobs)
Market-based

Remuneration

Longevity-linked

Career Benefits
Promises by
Employer

Lifetime Tenure
Opportunities for
Promotion

Training
Forming Networks

Due Process

Collective
Bargaining and
Grievance
Arbitration

Dispute-Resolution
Procedures for
Individual Fairness
Claims

25
Little to None

Piece rate / Pay as
you go
Flexible scheduling
Be your own minibusiness; Freedom
from wage labor;
Work will come to
you via your cell
phone
Little to None

Interest in collective efforts such as prediction markets, 117 the use of spare
computer cycles to search for intelligent life in the universe, and collective
efforts like Wikipedia began to grow in the early 2000s. 118 The
crowdwork model had its genesis in approximately 2005 with the spread
of mobile computing and the emergence of prosumer websites where
collective communities created goods that they would then purchase. 119
The “official” crowdwork platform for the Mechanical Turk was launched
in 2007.
There are fundamental differences between these models in the
construction of the labor and its conditions. While the industrial model
had a modicum of stability and secure remuneration, and arguably the
digital model had some of these features as well, the crowdwork model is
marked by rapid job fluctuation, decreasing authority of worker, a
decrease in skill required and along with it decreasing remuneration. The
impact of precarity, especially within the context of information
technology, is striking in crowdwork. If the digital era broke schedules
down into part-time or project-based shifts, crowdwork breaks those
schedules down even further into the micro-level. It moves from
“project” based work (with coherent aims and stages) occurring over a
117
See generally MICHAEL ABRAMOWITZ , PREDICTOCRACY (2007); Miriam A. Cherry & Robert L.
Rogers, Prediction Markets and the First Amendment, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 833 (2008).
118
YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS 9 (2006).
119
The portmanteau “prosumer” is comprised of the words producer and consumer. It is a new business
model that suggests that those that buy also have role in the creation of the item they purchase. Howe, supra
note [ ], describes the growth of Threadless, a T-shirt company built on a prosumer model. Community
members would enter contests to design shirts, and the ones with the most votes were then produced and sold.

26

Miriam A. Cherry

[18-Feb-16

duration of weeks, months, or years, into “task” based work (the purpose
of which may not ever be explained to workers) occurring in just hours,
minutes, or seconds. Micro labor is described as “taking the division of
labor to once-unthinkable extremes.” 120
Furthermore, some of the advantages of the digital era are even
weaker or non-existent in the “crowdsourcing” system. No longer are
there investments in employees for increased training, skills acquisition, or
networking opportunities. No longer is there any security of stable or
predictable work, not to mention a living or even, in some as alleged in
legal complaints, a minimum wage. Through automatic management,
there is little employee discretion over tasks, and almost no
communication with an actual supervisor who might train or coach the
worker to improve. Through automatic management, there are few
requirements or systems of due process. These are part of what
sociologists have termed “bad jobs”: no training, no advancement, low
pay, and no job security. 121
Further, many forms of crowdwork require prior ownership of
major equipment or property as a prerequisite for the job (a car to provide
rides, an apartment to rent out, a private Intenet connection, as examples).
In applying for a job, one may experience many immediate rejections. A
worker may have difficult odds in terms of facing a large number of
similar workers with the same skillset. The may also see many posts by
perspective employers that only want skills that are specialized or rare.
Rejection rates are high – the journalistic account of her crowdwork noted
that her success rate in obtaining tasks was only one in six. 122
There is temporal chaos and pressure as well: Tasks can be
cancelled while a worker is in the midst of completion. In those instances,
the requester typically does not pay. Rather, the worker must eat the cost.
Other times, tasks can get double-booked, as they are filled automatically
across websites that lack coordination. Even if a worker receives a full
day’s schedule of jobs, sometimes the commute between them, which is
unpaid, subtracts from net wages. Added to this is the competiveness and
surveillance in the crowdwork model. Workers have to achieve high
ratings, which are posted on the website. High ratings are not enough in
isolation, rather their scores are ranked, ordered, and the workers are
120
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expected to out-achieve each other. Workers also spend significant time
searching for jobs, finding and applying for each task, and do so quickly
so as to beat out colleagues working for the same website. As Kessler
summarizes:
“I' m essentially competing for every hour of my
123
employment.”
In many ways then, crowdsourcing is a return to industrial (or even
pre-industrial in terms of its pay by the piece and work at home) systems.
Crowdwork features highly rigid control systems and deskilled work.
While some observers describe that platform sites are efficient in matching
employers and workers, others point out that they drive down wages. At
the end of her run, Kessler earned on average $1.94 an hour on AMT (5
cents for every 55 clicks in labeling images); and a total of $166 a week
on TaskRabbit, which was slightly above the median rate for other
workers in her neighborhood on this website. 124
Meanwhile,
crowdworkers must rely on meager wages to make ends meet without
traditional employee benefits such as sick days or health insurance.
Ideally, technology should be a tool to assist workers, making
work easier and safer while boosting productivity. The logical outcome of
technology would be less time spent on work, coupled with better and
more satisfying jobs. “Bad jobs” – those that are dirty, dangerous, and
low-paying should increasingly be automated. The work week should
decrease and the gains from productivity should raise the average worker’s
standard of living.
Unfortunately to date, that is not the story of
crowdwork. In fact the last few years have seen rising economic
inequality, a bimodal distribution of good jobs and income, and bad jobs
and low pay, with no reduction in the average work week. 125 Although this
is a complex phenomenon, it is safe to say that the productivity gains of
technology are unevenly distributed. 126 Stone’s intermediate digital model
may have lacked job security, but at the least knowledge and
“employability” played an important role in knowledge economy jobs.
The crowdwork model may be more of a throwback to the
industrial model, incorporating the efficiency and control of automatic
management, without the industrial model’s job security or stability. But
this result is not inevitable. Technology should help us improve work
systems and work design, not facilitate a race to the bottom of deskilling
of work and lowered wages. So the real question with crowdwork and the
123
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on-demand economy is not whether the workers fall into a particular
doctrinal category of “employee” or “independent contractor,” as the
current legal cases have structured the question. Rather the question is
whether the crowdwork model that the on-demand economy moves us into
is a sustainable and desirable future of work.
III.

Conclusion

In this article, I hope to have first given the reader a timely update
regarding labor litigation in the on-demand economy litigation. Currently
these lawsuits mainly focus on the gateway question: Are the gig
economy workers “employees”? As of this writing, no clear consensus
seems to have emerged, and the tests that would be applied historically are
malleable. The litigation chart that was herein produced shows that the
issues have a similar and remarkable homogeneity even when looking at
forms of work as diverse as home repair, driving, and grocery delivery.
The second part of the paper sought to take a step back and analyze
the major issues that are lurking behind the cases and the doctrinal labels.
Crowdwork represents a new phase in the digital transformation of work.
Situated as it is in the cross-current of precarious work, automatic
management, and deskilling, the way crowdwork is currently formulated
presents a bleak and disturbing picture. But by recognizing the factors
that lead these to be considered “bad jobs,” perhaps we can then begin the
work that needs to be done to avoid this outcome.

